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Integrated Regulation of Nonpoint Pollution: Combining 1 
Managerial Controls and Economic Instruments under 2 
Multiple Environmental Targets 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
Regulators are often reluctant to rely solely on economic incentives to achieve 6 
environmental standards. We evaluate a "mixed approach" of economic instruments and 7 
management standards when two environmental objectives need to be met simultaneously: 8 
minimum river flow rates and reductions in nitrate pollution. We show how the relative 9 
efficiency of such mixed approaches can depend on exogenous factors, in this case weather 10 
conditions. Results indicate that mixed instruments outperform stand-alone economic 11 
incentives or managerial controls under wet weather conditions, but not in 'average' years. 12 
However, the relative cost-effectiveness of mixed approaches increases considerably at 13 
higher levels of environmental standard compliance. 14 
 15 
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1. Introduction 26 
Regulators have proved reluctant to use economic instruments as "stand alone" methods to 27 
address environmental problems, despite the strong case in favour of economic incentives 28 
made by economists over the last 30 years (Hahn 2000). Indeed, evidence shows that 29 
economic instruments still account for the minority of environmental measures employed 30 
within the OECD, although their use is increasing (OECD 1997; NCEE 2004). It can be argued 31 
this reluctance is due to the political economy of environmental regulation - for example, 32 
regulators may consider criteria other than economic efficiency
1
 as more important when 33 
designing policies to regulate an environmental externality. This is the case for both point 34 
and nonpoint source pollution (NPP), with multiple decision criteria and worries over the 35 
shortcomings of economic instruments combining to restrict the up-take of such policies 36 
(Hanley et al. 1990). Moreover, economists have identified circumstances when a 37 
combination of measures – such as a tax combined with regulation – are better suited to 38 
achieve regulatory outcomes, for example in the case of stochastic pollutants  (Baumol et al. 39 
1988) and when both the mean and variance of pollutant concentration is of concern 40 
(Braden et al. 1993). Studying the effects of combining economic instruments with 41 
managerial or regulatory measures may thus be more relevant than the traditional simple 42 
comparison of economic instruments with regulation.   43 
An important new policy context is the European Union's Water Framework 44 
Directive (WFD) (EU 2000). The WFD sets the target of ‘Good Ecological Status’ in surface 45 
waters throughout Europe. In some catchments this implies the joint imposition of 46 
minimum river flow restrictions (water quantity) and ambient pollutant standards (water 47 
                                                 
1
 Other criteria may include equity (distributional impacts), certainty of regulatory compliance, ancillary environmental 
benefits, simplicity, enforcement costs, political acceptability or perceived fairness. This is not to imply that economic 
instruments alone are necessarily most efficient, or cannot be perceived as fair or politically acceptable. 
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quality). A wider use of economic instruments is called for in the Directive, although not to 48 
the exclusion of managerial or direct regulatory approaches, whilst great stress is placed on 49 
cost-effectiveness of pollution control measures. Since the measurement of Good Ecological 50 
Status depends on a number of parameters, including nutrient status, biological oxygen 51 
demand and flow rates, then regulators are faced with the problem of achieving multiple 52 
environmental targets simultaneously (DEFRA 2007). This is an interesting context in which 53 
to assess the relative benefits of single versus combined instruments for environmental 54 
management, particularly since the processes which regulators are trying to manage are 55 
inherently stochastic. 56 
In this paper, we develop a multi-farm catchment model  which estimates the cost of 57 
improving water quality, where water quality depends both on diffuse-source nitrate 58 
pollution and river flows for a case study catchment in Scotland through combinations of 59 
management measures and economic instruments. The paper builds on Aftab et al. (2007)
2
 60 
and is more realistic in capturing multi-agent farm level heterogeneity. Both flow rates and 61 
nitrate levels are linked to agricultural land use, the former through irrigation. The 4,346 ha 62 
West Peffer catchment suffers from low flow problems in summer due to high rates of 63 
abstraction for potato farming and is presently subject to direct abstraction controls
3
, and 64 
has N levels in breach of the EU guideline standard of 11.3 mg/l N. Diffuse nitrogen 65 
pollution, which can result in eutrophication, contamination of potable water and 66 
acidification, is a widely acknowledged problem in Scotland (Darcy et al. 2000). High rates of 67 
surface water extraction can lead to periods of unusually low river flows, adversely affecting 68 
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 Aftab et al. (2007) quantifies the increase in social welfare from co-ordinating policies to maintain river flows and 
nonpoint nitrate pollution and the conditions under which it is beneficial.  
3
 The regulator stops abstractions through licence suspension when river flow falls to the 95%ile (or minimum acceptable 
flow) at specific gauging points. 
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river ecology and amenity values (Hanley et al, 2006). Responding to these two problems is 69 
likely to be best achieved by an integrated approach to catchment management: indeed, 70 
that is exactly what the WFD mandates for all catchments throughout the EU.  71 
Previous work on the economics of agricultural NPP control has largely focussed on 72 
this problem in hydrological isolation. Economic instruments are known to be relatively 73 
cost-efficient way of reducing ambient nitrate levels under a range of restrictive conditions 74 
(Shortle et al. 2001). Numerous authors have previously considered the use of mixed 75 
approaches or policy 'packages': combining input taxes and a liability rule (Braden et al. 76 
1993); input and ambient taxes (Horan et al. 1998); emission and ambient taxes 77 
(Xepapadeas 1995); emission and output tax (Schmutzler 1996); ex post negligence liability 78 
and ex ante pigouvian taxation (Kolstad et al. 1990);  land use tax with an input tax (Goetz et 79 
al. 2006); and combining a subsidy/tax with marketable licences (Roberts et al. 1976). These 80 
studies report efficiency gains from the use of mixed instruments. However, although some 81 
studies have considered spatially untargeted land retirement (setaside) to reduce NPP from 82 
agriculture (Ribaudo et al. 1994)  the literature has not considered the integration of direct 83 
regulation or managerial approaches, such as setaside and stocking density reduction, with 84 
economic instruments. Likewise, although there are studies investigating the joint control of 85 
both water and nitrogen as inputs (Weinberg et al. 1993; Helfand et al. 1995; Larson et al. 86 
1996; Albiac et al. 2001), only one study to date has reported on the efficiency properties of 87 
economic instruments in the presence of river flow controls (Aftab et al. 2007).  88 
Previous work has established that the variability in NPP generation requires 89 
combining instruments that apply to specific moments of the pollution distribution to 90 
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ensure efficiency
4
 (Braden et al. 1993). Baumol and Oates, in their classic text propose 91 
Mixed Instruments (MI) combining economic instruments and discretionary 'direct' controls 92 
when regulating stochastic point source emissions
5
 (Baumol et al. 1988). Obviously, this is 93 
only possible with certain point source pollutants - the possibility of using direct control 94 
during a high pollution episode to control NPP is not feasible. The question thus remains as 95 
to which are the most cost effective instruments to combine, given the problems of 96 
implementing diffuse pollution controls. The main contribution of this paper to the 97 
literature is thus conceptual: in the context of NPP from agriculture and multiple 98 
environmental targets, is it better to use a combination of economic incentives and 99 
managerial measures, rather than economic incentives alone? This MI approach is relevant 100 
to the policy debate since the iterative approach to developing environmental policy which 101 
dominates OECD countries does not favour ‘drastic’ changes in policy choice e.g. from 102 
regulation only to economic instruments only. Efficiency requires regulation of NPP 103 
emissions at both the intensive and extensive margin (Shortle et al. 1998; Goetz et al. 2006). 104 
Moreover, the inclusion of transaction costs might make it cost effective to restrict the 105 
pollution reduction contribution from the extensive margin using managerial controls, such 106 
as setaside, in a MI setting. Weather variability turns out to be important in determining 107 
whether a MI approach is more cost-effective than using stand alone economic incentives. 108 
We use the same data set on which Aftab et al (2007) is based to investigate the efficiency 109 
gains from MI. However the focus of the paper is not on specific empirical results; but rather 110 
the conceptual contribution in a policy context. 111 
                                                 
4
 Unless emissions mean and variance are correlated a single instrument will not ensure social optimality. 
5
 "...we may realise the best of both worlds by taking advantage of  the efficiency properties of tax measures in normal 
circumstances and invoking direct controls to copy with temporary periods of accentuated environmental deterioration" 
(Baumol et al. 1988).  
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 112 
2. Model Construction  113 
The bio-physical-economic model improves on a previous model in the literature  114 
(Aftab et al. 2007) and differs in that the catchment is modelled as 4 separate profit 115 
maximising farms (f1 – f4). The 4 farms are hypothetical, as individual farm data is not made 116 
available due to confidentiality concerns, and represent variability in farm characteristics 117 
across the catchment. The farms differ in terms of 1) acreage, 2) proportion of 3 soil 118 
textures (hence crop mix and rotation), and 3) livestock production capacity
6
. The 119 
differences between the 4 farms serve as a proxy for catchment heterogeneity (Wossink et 120 
al. 2001) in terms of farming knowledge/experience, spatial characteristics, preferences and 121 
capital/infrastructure considerations. 122 
Four major arable crops (winter wheat, spring barely, winter oilseed rape, and 123 
potatoes), livestock production (dairy, sheep, lowland suckler and intensive beef), 124 
permanent grazing grass and silage production were modelled. Farms also had the option to 125 
purchase silage from the market. Catchment agronomic practices and parameters, crop 126 
rotations and the existing baseline scenario were taken from the literature and catchment 127 
level farm survey data. Farm subsidies for both arable cultivation and livestock (SOAEFD 128 
1997) were included. The farmer’s decision to apply nitrogen depends on crop production 129 
functions for each crop (separate for each soil type) and profitability. The model was 130 
calibrated to the 1997/98 price level (SAC 1997). Potatoes were assumed to be the only 131 
irrigated crop (they account for 85% of irrigated catchment land in reality) and the cost of 132 
irrigation per hectare was incorporated.  133 
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 Of the total catchment area 20% is categorised sandy, 16.8% as silty and 63% as loamy. The four farms make up 15%, 
30%, 34.6% and 20.4% of total catchment acreage;  and 15%, 0%, 60% and 25% of baseline catchment livestock at a 
stocking density of 2 LU/ha. 
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The model determines the most profitable land and nitrogen allocation to each farm 134 
activity.  Livestock waste is accounted for as a source of nitrate and is a substitute for 135 
artificial fertiliser on both types of modelled grassland. The model uses separate leaching 136 
functions to estimate the weekly average leaching for 3 ‘stylised’ years (dry, mean and wet
7
) 137 
based on the actual weather in the 1989-98 period. Leaching functions were derived by 138 
regressing the output of NITCAT (Lord 1992) for each crop/soil combination within a 139 
reasonable range of nitrogen applications. The IRRIGUIDE model (Bailey et al. 1996) was 140 
used to give crop-dependent weekly values of evapo-transpiration over winter; while 141 
elution was modelled using the SLIMMER algorithm (Anthony et al. 1996). Grass land 142 
leaching was estimated using NCYCLE (Scholefield et al. 1991; Lockyer et al. 1995). Here, 143 
leaching refers to the nitrogen not taken up by the plant which drains to the sub soil water. 144 
Some is lost to groundwater, while most drains to the river. The model assumes the 145 
nitrogen leachate moves via drains to the river instantaneously. This enables relatively 146 
accurate approximation of diffuse nitrogen pollution levels for every week.  147 
 In Eastern Scotland, irrigation contributes to potato yield and quality. The West 148 
Peffer catchment is extensively used for surface water extraction and is presently subject to 149 
controls whereby abstraction licences are suspended when river flow falls to the 95
th
 150 
percentile (MAF) one-day flow at specific gauging points (Crabtree et al. 2000). The 95
th
 151 
percentile flow defines a flow exceeded naturally on 95% of days in a ‘average’ year (1989 – 152 
1998 period) during which no abstraction took place.  The DIY hydrological model was used 153 
to estimate naturalised flows (Dunn 1998) and the water available for potato irrigation 154 
before the 90
th
, 95
th
 and 98
th
 percentile MAF target was breached (the 90
th
 percentile 155 
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 The mean weather scenario was based on the average weather data in the period, whereas the wet weather referred to 
the wettest in this period. The use of wet and mean ‘weather’ or ‘weather conditions’ refer to the wet and mean weather 
year in this period respectively. 
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imposes the greatest restriction on irrigation extraction while 98
th
 percentile imposes the 156 
smallest
8
). The absence of any river flow restriction was also considered. The temporal 157 
distribution of available water was then inputted to a potato growth model. It was assumed 158 
the farmer could subject his potato crop to 3 separate levels of irrigation: optimal, restricted 159 
and no irrigation. Separate nitrogen potato production functions under 4 river flow 160 
restrictions, 3 irrigation regimes and 3 weather conditions were then approximated 161 
(Crabtree et al. 2000).  162 
 163 
3. Economic Modelling of Control Policies 164 
The entire bio-physical economic model is summarised in figure 1. The non-linear 165 
optimization model was written in GAMS (Brooke et al. 1998) and solved using the CONOPT 166 
II solver (Stolbjerg-Drud 1993) and confirmed by the MINOS 5 solver. The catchment is 167 
modelled as four economic decision makers ( )f  who are assumed to maximise individual 168 
farm profits ( )ϖΠ rf  by endogenously determining land and N fertiliser allocation to 169 
productive activities
9
 on each soil type. The regulator’s objective is to minimise the 170 
difference between the unrestricted catchment profit 
ϖ Π 
 
∑ rf
f
and the catchment profit 171 
under different pollution control policies subject to environmental constraints on minimum 172 
river flows and maximum nitrate levels
10
. The regulator’s objective is: 173 
                                                 
8
 The minimum acceptable river flow percentile seems counter intuitive, but this is a hydrological term. A 98
th
 percentile 
one day flow is a less binding constraint, than the 90
th
 percentile, as it would restrict abstraction only when flow fell to that 
exceeded on 98% of days. 
9
 Productive activity refers to crops (including potatoes crops with different irrigation scheduling), livestock production 
(grassland) and setaside. Similar to previous bio-physical economic models in the economic literature. 
10
 A referee thankfully pointed out that even though the model is represented as minimising farmer’s abatement cost  
(Beavis et al. 1983; Kampas et al. 2004) , it is in effect forecasting farmer’s profit maximising behaviour under different 
regulatory controls – a positive analysis. 
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(1)  Minimise  ( )ϖ ϖΠ − − + +

∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑r n rf fcs c fcs fcs fij j fb b
f f c s i j b
Y p w n l h p a p  174 
     
ϖ ϖη λ µ  − − − + Τ  
  
∑ ∑∑n r rfi fi fts fts f f
i t s
w m C               175 
where ϖ is the prevailing weather condition (dry, mean, or wet) and r is the catchment 176 
MAF restriction (no flow restriction or 98
th
, 95
th
 or 90
th
 percentile river flow restriction) 177 
enforced by the regulator. f
ϖκΠ  for each rϖ combination is the outcome of an unrestricted 178 
run of the model without any regulation on farm f . The catchment profit in the objective 179 
function is defined as the sum of the return to each producer’s management and allocation 180 
of resources minus the cost of total farm nitrogen consumption ( n fcs fcs
c s
w n l∑∑ (arable 181 
crops), n fi fi
i
w η λ∑ (potatoes), µ∑∑n fts fts
t s
w m (silage and grazing grass)) and all other 182 
secondary costs of farming fC .  Exogenous terms in (1) include cp  the market price of 183 
arable crop c , jp  the market price of potato quality j  and bp is the market return from one 184 
livestock unit
11
 (LU) of livestock type b . The number of livestock on each farm is 185 
represented by fba . 
nw  refers to the cost of nitrogen fertiliser, fcsn and fcsl is the nitrogen 186 
applied and land allocated to arable crop c (excluding potatoes and grassland) c on soil type 187 
s . ftsm  and ftsµ  refer respectively to land and nitrogen allocated to grassland type t  188 
(grazing and cutting). 
r
fi
ϖλ and rfiϖη refer to land allocated and nitrogen applied to the potato 189 
crop under irrigation regime i (optimal, restricted or un-irrigated) resulting in potato yield 190 
ϖ r
fijh  differentiated by quality j . fΤ  refers all transfer payments, positive for input and 191 
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 A livestock unit is defined in terms of the metabolised energy requirement. With one unit being the maintenance of a 
mature 625kg Friesian cow and the production of a 40-45 kg calf, and 4,500 litres of milk at 36 g/kg of butterfat and 86 g/kg 
s.n.f. Based on this the LU units of all livestock is calculated, e.g.: suckler cow (1 LU), ewe (0.15 LU), male cattle less than 2 
years (0.6 LU), male cattle over 2 years (1 LU).   
10 
 
emission taxes and negative for subsides related to enforcing setaside or stocking density 192 
reductions, where relevant. Such transfer payments are not included in estimates of 193 
abatement costs (Kampas et al. 2004).  194 
Thus, (1) estimates the social cost of regulation under different regulatory policies 195 
and weather conditions
12
. The model’s baseline allocation was calibrated
13
 to farm survey 196 
data on cropping and livestock intensities. The model’s mean weather (no MAF restriction) 197 
base run predictions were similar to actual catchment data. The percentage deviation 198 
between the two being: -7.15% for arable crops, 4.90% for grassland, -11.79 % for set-aside 199 
land and -4.05% for catchment livestock units (LU)
14
.  The model allocates slightly more land 200 
to grassland at the expense of arable land and setaside. 201 
Depending on the most profitable land use and nitrogen input allocation, the model 202 
calculated the total nitrate emissions generated and the volume of water transporting them 203 
to the river, for different weather scenarios and MAF river flow restrictions (met via 204 
restrictions on the extraction of water for irrigation). The transaction costs of enforcing MAF 205 
river flow restrictions and NPP control policies are not included in our model and is an 206 
obvious limitation. The policy objective in all model runs was to reduce ambient nitrate 207 
concentrations below the EU 50mg 
−
3NO /l (or 11.3 mg N/l) limit for a variable number of 208 
weeks while achieving various minimum river flow restrictions
15
. Nitrate concentrations vary 209 
naturally through the year due to fluctuations in rainfall and crop demands. We thus 210 
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 Further details of modelling can be found at: WEB ADDRESS. 
13
 Calibration involved using proportional ratios and bounds, total grassland acreage was not fixed and allowed to vary to 
reflect changes in stocking density. Under some regulatory policy packages certain livestock constraints were relaxed to 
allow achieving stricter regulatory targets. In such circumstances we undertook appropriate sensitivity analysis in relaxing 
constraints. Standard agricultural modelling techniques were used (Barnard et al. 1973) 
14
 For arable activities (grassland and setaside) percentage average deviation (PAD) = 20.58 and for livestock (LU) PAD = 
10.13.  
15
 MAF river flow restrictions were set independently of pollution control policy. The regulator could not resort to irrigation 
controls beyond those required to meet MAF river flow restrictions for the purpose of controlling NPP generation. 
Irrigation control by itself is not a cost effective pollution control option as only potatoes are irrigated. However the slight 
reduction in NPP generation due to MAF restrictions was considered in the design of pollution control regulation.   
11 
 
implement the nitrate standard as the number of weeks in which ambient concentrations 211 
are predicted to exceed the EU standard (a zero exceedance target is unrealistic).  212 
A set of ‘stand alone’ policy options based on the literature and current policy 213 
discussions were chosen. These were: 1)  estimated emission taxation 2) nitrogen input 214 
taxation (IT) (Kampas et al. 2004), 3) emission quotas, 4) nitrogen input quotas (Wu et al. 215 
1995), 5) managerial restrictions resulting in farm livestock stocking density reduction 216 
(FSDR) and, 6) restriction on the minimum area of farm set-aside (farm land retirement - 217 
FLR
16
), since land retirement if correctly managed can be used to reduce diffuse pollution 218 
(Burt et al. 1993a; Ribaudo et al. 1994).  219 
 The main contribution of this paper, as noted earlier, is in evaluating environmental 220 
control strategies which combine economic incentives with managerial approaches – that is, 221 
in evaluating mixed instrument strategies in the presence of multiple environmental targets. 222 
Four types of mixed instrument policy packages were simulated. These were: a) FLR with IT, 223 
b) FLR with FSDR, c) FSDR and IT and d) both FLR and FSDR with IT. All policy options were 224 
considered both with and without a 90
th
 percentile river flow restriction (the most stringent 225 
of those modelled), as illustrative of the impacts on policy choice of having multiple 226 
environmental targets, rather than a single target. All of the above control instruments were 227 
uniformly applied across the four farms (i.e. not modelled as farm specific targeted policies) 228 
and simulated as iterative runs of the model for each ϖκ  combination. For example the 229 
catchment emission quota was incrementally decreased until the target compliance with 230 
the environmental standard was achieved. The managerial control options were also 231 
                                                 
16
 FLR was modelled both as a) a percentage of total farm area, and b) as a percentage of total arable area (winter wheat, 
spring barley, winter oilseed rape and FLR itself). The later measurement is used to qualify for subsides under the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1997/98 obligatory FLR was 5% of total arable area.  
12 
 
modelled as gradual increases in FLR and decreases in farm stocking density until the 232 
number of weeks the river nitrate concentration exceeded the EU standard was acceptable. 233 
 234 
4. Results 235 
Figures 2 and 3 represent the social cost of regulation as the percentage reduction from 236 
baseline catchment resource profit under different nitrate pollution control policies without 237 
river MAF restrictions in mean and with/without a MAF restriction in wet weather 238 
conditions respectively. A figure for mean weather conditions with MAF restrictions is not 239 
presented as it is consistent with the conclusions deduced from analysing figures 2. The 240 
nitrate standard was not breached under dry weather conditions
17
. The baseline profit 241 
under mean weather conditions without a MAF restriction was £8.91m while in the wet year 242 
it was £9.04m. The severity of nitrate controls increases when moving from left to right 243 
along the x-axis in each Figure, since this implies fewer weeks when the standard is 244 
breached
18
. Mixed instruments combining economic and managerial controls are 245 
represented by discontinuous lines (3 instrument mixes by dotted lines and 2 instrument 246 
mixes by dashed lines). The maximum pollution for each stimulated regulatory policy is 247 
represented by its starting point (left-most point).  248 
The 8 and 4 week standard compliance ‘regulatory targets’ were arbitrarily chosen to 249 
illustrate the effect of progressively tightened regulatory targets, with the 4-week target 250 
being the tightest (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). The percentage reduction in social cost due to 251 
regulation relative to the baseline for each modelled scenario is provided in Table 1. It is 252 
interesting to note that in Table 1, both three-instrument MIs display the least variation in 253 
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 In some catchments with different soils, slope, topography, weather patterns etc. the nitrate standard maybe more likely 
to be breached in dry weather conditions because less water is available for dilution. However, here the dilution factor is 
offset by the reduced rainfall-induced runoff and leaching under dry weather conditions. 
18
 Figures 2 and 3 in order represent increasing soil profile water drainage and hence more NPP generation. 
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catchment resource cost across the modelled scenarios. With a stand- alone IT, catchment 254 
resource cost varies between 1.7% and 28.5% whereas for a combined FSDR(40% LU/ha) + 255 
FLR(35% ha) + IT the range is only between 14.7% and 18.2%. Although Table 2, a ranking of 256 
policies based on social resource cost, simplifies the results it masks the magnitude of social 257 
resource cost differences between policies. Uniform (estimated) emission taxation is 258 
superior to other controls (Johnson et al. 1991) and outperforms input taxation provided 259 
the emission function exhibits increasing returns to scale (Stevens 1988).  There are nominal 260 
differences between nitrogen IT and nitrogen quotas - a result which is likely if 261 
heterogeneity in leaching or production functions is present (Wu 1999; Wu et al. 2001). 262 
However the cost-effective difference between the two becomes more apparent at higher 263 
regulatory targets. 264 
Table 3, which is a comparison of instrument levels required to induce compliance 265 
under the modelled scenarios, is intuitively consistent in that instruments levels required to 266 
control pollution at the 8 week target are lower than those required for the 4 week target. 267 
Similarly the instrument levels required to achieve any target under mean weather 90
th
 268 
percentile MAF are lower than those required under mean weather without any MAF 269 
restriction, which in turn are lower than those required under wet weather. 270 
 271 
4.1 Ranking under mean weather conditions 272 
Mean weather results (Figures 2) illustrate the superiority of economic instruments when 273 
compared to stand-alone managerial approaches such as set-aside and livestock density 274 
reduction. It is interesting to note that although single instrument economic approaches 275 
generally perform better than MI policies there are exceptions.  A FSDR (1.4 LU/ha) + IT mix 276 
out performs IT at the 2 week regulatory target and onwards in the mean year without any 277 
14 
 
MAF restriction. Mixed managerial policies do better than single managerial policies at 278 
higher levels of standard compliance. A combination of FSDR and FLR is more cost effective 279 
at meeting the 5 week ambient pollution standards than FLR alone. In addition the 280 
managerial combination achieves the 4 week regulatory target whereas each managerial 281 
instrument by itself does not.  282 
 283 
The difference in cost-effectiveness between economic and managerial policies increases as 284 
the regulatory target is tightened, i.e. managerial control lines exhibit a greater negative 285 
slope. FSDR does slightly better than FLR on the whole. However the difference in social cost 286 
between the two is reduced at higher levels of standard compliance and undergoes a ‘cross-287 
over’ at the 5 week regulatory target in the case without MAF (figure 2). Interestingly, both 288 
combinations of FLR (14%) + IT and the FSDR (1.4LU/ha) + IT outperform IT alone at the 4 289 
and 2 week regulatory target respectively. These results confirm that the relative cost-290 
effectiveness of mixed instruments improves as the regulatory target is tightened.  291 
 292 
4.2 Ranking under wet weather conditions  293 
Since flow rates are higher in wetter years, abstraction constraints do not affect control 294 
instruments in the wet weather scenario. However, some interesting results still emerge. 295 
Although estimated emission taxes remains the most cost effective policy in a wet year, the 296 
relative efficiency of other policies changes considerably (figure 3 and table 2). In wetter 297 
conditions, nitrogen leaching rates (emissions) are considerably higher with a leaching 298 
baseline of 18 weeks of river nitrogen levels in excess of the standard, compared to 14 299 
weeks in the mean year (compare the baseline water quality statistics in table 4 and 5). 300 
Another notable change under wetter conditions is that economic controls targeting inputs 301 
15 
 
(input taxation and quota) do not perform as well, especially at high standard compliance 302 
levels (refer to the 4 week target - figure 3).  In comparison, mixed instrument policies 303 
perform considerably better in wet weather conditions. The cost effectiveness of FLR/set-304 
aside mix policies increases as the regulatory target is tightened - consider the difference in 305 
the social costs between input taxation and FLR/set-aside mix polices at 10, 8, 6 and 4 week 306 
standard compliance target (or compare ranking in table 2). In fact from the 8 week 307 
regulatory and onwards (stricter compliance) FLR + IT mixes are second only to estimated 308 
emission taxation. 309 
The most dramatic cost-effective ‘cross-over’ involves FLR improving relative to IT as 310 
the regulatory target is tightened. At best in figure 3 IT outperforms FLR left of the shaded 311 
zone (figure 3) at the 10 week target by 7.29%, however right of the shaded zone FLR 312 
delivers the 4 week regulatory target with an improvement of  8.05% over IT. In figure 3 the 313 
shaded zone represents the 9-5 week regulatory target zone in which 2 instrument mixes 314 
prevail over single input based instruments. Both FSDR + IT and FLR + IT combinations 315 
manage to be more efficient than IT by itself. The FLR + IT combinations dominate the 316 
stricter end of this zone. Interestingly, 3 instrument mixes comprising of FSDR + FLR + IT 317 
extend the cost-effective lead of mixed instruments over the best feasible stand alone 318 
instrument, IT. In fact 3-instrument mixes dominate the strict end of the regulatory target 319 
spectrum, i.e. from the 5 week regulatory target onwards
19
.  320 
 321 
 322 
 323 
 324 
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 To illustrate, at the 4 week target a FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR (35%) + IT mix confers a catchment resource cost gain of 
13.373% over IT (table 1 and figure 3). Other mixed instruments provide further efficiency gains at the more stringent end 
of the regulatory target spectrum. E.g. a policy mix of FLR (50%) + IT provides an efficiency gain of 10.792% over IT at the 3 
week regulatory target (not shown in figure 3). 
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4.3 Impact of policies on water quality metrics 325 
Even though the same regulatory target can be achieved at varying cost by different policies 326 
the actual impact on water quality is likely to differ. Mean weather river N concentration 327 
metrics (mg N/l) at the 8 regulatory standard are presented in table 4.  Economic 328 
instruments have a lower maximum, 90
th
 percentile and standard deviation than MI and 329 
stand alone managerial controls. Water quality effects from economic instruments are also 330 
negatively skewed whereas managerial and most mixed instruments are positively skewed. 331 
Interestingly the 3 instrument MI policies are notably different in that there is conspicuous 332 
reduction in a) the mean, b) the degree of negative kurtosis, and c) the 80
th
 percentile river 333 
concentration relative to other policies. Wet weather river water metrics (table 5) reflect 334 
higher pollution levels relative to mean weather, e.g. mean > median and positive skewness. 335 
However the greatest increase in positive skewness is associated with the 3 instrument MI 336 
policies. Interestingly, in table 5, the 3 instrument mixes are leptokurtic (positive kurtosis) 337 
whereas all other instruments are platykurtic (negative kurtosis). This implies that the 3 338 
instrument mixed instruments have more acute peaks with fatter tails relative to a normal 339 
distribution. They also exhibit the lowest 80
th
 percentile value (table 5).  340 
Both FLR and FSDR exhibit greater positive skewness and relatively positive excess 341 
kurtosis across the weather conditions when compared to stand alone economic controls. 342 
Thus, in both weather conditions, the presence of FLR in any mixed policy tends to result in 343 
more positive skewness and kurtosis. This Implies that although FLR mix policies allow 344 
higher value outliers for ambient pollution levels they also exhibit a tendency to be tightly 345 
clustered around the mean. In other words, in weeks the standard is violated river N 346 
concentration is likely to be higher under FLR mix policies than under stand alone economic 347 
instruments. However there is more clustering of weeks around the mean N concentration. 348 
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For example the 80
th
 percentile in table 5 falls near the 11.3 mg/l N standard for most 349 
economic instruments, but coincides with lower concentrations of 10.528 and 9.853 mg/l N 350 
for the two 3 instrument policy mixes. 351 
 The trade off between catchment resource cost and water quality is more apparent 352 
when water quality metrics are considered. The 3-instrument MIs are nearly 10 times more 353 
expensive than IT under mean weather conditions because they ‘over-abate’ pollution 354 
(consider the lower mean, 80
th
 percentile and relatively higher excess kurtosis). River water 355 
quality with both 3 instrument MI is, on the other hand, far better than under IT alone in 356 
mean weather conditions – even though they meet the same regulatory target.  However, 357 
our results for water quality metrics dismiss the notion that stand-alone managerial policies 358 
are less efficient because they ‘over-abate’. In actual fact they are both costly to farmers 359 
and do not over-abate pollution to ensure compliance with regulatory targets.  The mean 360 
and standard deviation of ambient pollution with pure managerial policies remain 361 
consistently higher than all other controls.  362 
 363 
 364 
4.4 Discussion  365 
 366 
In a second best world instruments which regulate indirectly by controlling a subset of 367 
production choices (inputs or management practices) which are relatively easy to observe 368 
and correlated with emissions.  However regulating the intensity of one input affects the 369 
intensity of all other inputs, thus an input tax (intensive margin) should be accompanied by 370 
a restriction on land acreage (extensive margin) (Shortle et al. 1998). This may take the form 371 
of a lump sum tax on extra-marginal land/firms or some managerial restriction.  372 
 Our main results, summarised in Table 6, indicate a change in policy ranking in 373 
wetter conditions which can be intuitively explained by the difference in the impacts of each 374 
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instrument at the intensive and extensive margin. In a second best world,  as both the 375 
allocation of land to particular uses and N fertiliser application intensity effect diffuse 376 
pollution moments, both should be regulated to ensure social welfare (Braden and 377 
Segerson, 1993). Economic and managerial controls limit pollution generation in different 378 
ways.  While set-aside removes land from agriculture (i.e. acts at the extensive margin), 379 
input quotas and taxation do not. Although input taxation and quotas provide an incentive 380 
to decrease nitrogen consumption per hectare (intensive margin), farmers still apply 381 
nitrogen and the incentive to take land out of production is too low
20
. Thus the potential to 382 
leach remains in a wet year. During a high rainfall pollution episode setaside confers a 383 
dilution effect, i.e. the N concentration from leachate and run-off is very low and offsets the 384 
higher concentration diffuse pollution from intensively used agricultural land (low FSDR 385 
grassland offers  less of a dilution  – depending on the stocking density). If the regulator sets 386 
an input tax based on expected (mean) nitrate loss then the ambient nitrate target (number 387 
of weeks exceeding standard) will only be met on average. If wetter weather prevails more 388 
nitrate is leached and the required compliance level is not achieved
21
. Thus single 389 
instruments based on mean emissions do not account for the risks of stochastic loads, and 390 
may  be neither efficient nor effective (Shortle et al. 1998; Elofsson 2003).  391 
In contrast, farm stocking density reduction (FSDR) reduces the intensity of land use 392 
(intensive margin) by either re-allocating land from arable crops to grassland or by reducing 393 
the number of livestock in production or both. Both changes would reduce nitrogen input 394 
use on grassland. Very low stocking density rates are associated with near-zero N input to 395 
                                                 
20
 Provided the benefit of growing a crop exceeds the cost - everything considered. Goetz et al.(2006) note that the crop 
mix  may change as a result of levying an input tax.   
21
 To illustrate, the optimal tax level ensuring standard compliance at the 4 week regulatory target given mean weather 
conditions is an after tax input cost of £1.50/kg nitrate (see table 3). However in wet conditions this results in the standard 
being violated in 11 weeks. The  significantly higher after tax input cost of £25.53/kg nitrate is required to achieve the 4 
week target in wet weather conditions. 
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grassland, which is in effect similar to taking land out of production, similar to setaside. 396 
FSDR therefore performs relatively better under wet conditions than mean weather 397 
conditions when compared to an input tax or quota. (compare the 6-week standard in 398 
Figures 2 and 3)
22
.  Obviously the greater the livestock density in a catchment, the more 399 
effective leverage FSDR policies exert.  400 
Overall  our results imply  the existence of  cross-overs in the relative efficiency 401 
ranking of policies across weather scenarios
23
. NPP is determined by land management, 402 
physical soil properties, topography and weather - pollution episodes are highly correlated 403 
with periodic flash rainfall (Burt et al. 1993b) . Thus evidence for efficiency ‘cross overs’ 404 
from mean to wet weather, or that cost-effective regulation may vary depending on 405 
weather makes sense intuitively.   Previous empirical studies have reported such cross-overs 406 
across abatement cost frontiers (Miltz et al. 1988; Braden et al. 1989) but not across 407 
weather scenarios.  It should be noted that although estimated emission taxes remain the 408 
least cost option in all weather/flow requirement scenarios, their supremacy is misleading 409 
as in reality they are impractical
24
.  410 
The results are best explained by the difference in incentives provided by economic 411 
and managerial instruments at the intensive and extensive margin. It is likely that the 412 
efficiency of MI would improve further if the managerial components were spatially 413 
targeted to more 'leaky' soils
25
, unfortunately our modelling did not permit such analysis. 414 
This superiority of MI  at higher regulatory target levels is encouraging if one takes the view 415 
                                                 
22
 Additionally a FSDR (1.4 lu/ha) + IT mix, which is second to input based policies, in the 15 – 10 week regulatory target 
range manages to outperform IT from the 9 week target onwards (Fig. 3).   
23
 In a stochastic model with probabilistic environmental constraint this would be the equivalent of saying that policy 
ranking is not consistent across reliability (target) levels. 
24
 Estimated emission taxation is off the political agenda because it assumes farmers: a) perfectly understand the 
regulator’s modelled relationship between management practices, nitrogen applications, weather  patterns and emissions,  
b) are risk neutral (Schmutzler 1996), and c) have the same weather expectations as the regulator (Shortle et al. 1986). 
Models at present cannot estimate emissions accurately enough to withstand legal challenges and the transaction costs of 
complex models can be substantial (Shoemaker et al. 1993).  
25
 Land retirement, if appropriately targeted, can generate sufficient benefits to outweigh social costs (Ribaudo et al. 1994). 
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that regulators are likely to prefer integrating economic instruments with 416 
managerial/regulatory approaches, rather than relying entirely on either alone, since 417 
environmental objectives are often ratcheted up over time.  418 
 We also considered the impact of the weather variability on policy choice. Ultimately 419 
the regulator faces the difficult decision of choosing a policy instrument level(s) which 420 
meets the regulatory target cost effectively across a variety of weather conditions, or of 421 
setting instrument level(s) and choices on the basis of “most sensitive” conditions. As nitrate 422 
loadings are highly variable both within and among different years  (Halstead et al. 1991), 423 
i.e. weather is stochastic, the regulator’s decision should be based not only on the expected 424 
weather but also its variance (Braden et al. 1993; Teague et al. 1995; Shortle et al. 1998). 425 
However, another important consideration is the required level of standard compliance and 426 
the regulator’s aversion to the regulatory target being exceeded in wet years or, in the 427 
extreme case, at all.  If the regulator wants to ensure the standard is achieved most of the 428 
time with certainty and adopts the precautionary principle, instrument levels should be 429 
based on the wet weather scenario, albeit at a greater compliance cost. The greater the 430 
aversion to the standard’s violation the more likely the regulator will favour policies which 431 
perform better in wet years
26
. Thus the trade-off between regulatory certitude of 432 
compliance in wet weather versus increased social cost of compliance in mean weather 433 
conditions. By implicit implication a regulator’s risk aversion determines policy choice
27
. 434 
Indeed, efficiency is very unlikely to be the sole criteria by which a regulator considers 435 
instruments (Hanley et al. 1990) . In addition a control policy based on wet weather may be 436 
                                                 
26
 As our model does not factor the accumulation of N in the soil it implies that instruments which achieve lower levels of 
standard compliance may actually fail over time.  
27
 In the literature this is indirectly recognised as policy ranking not being consistent across various reliability levels 
(Kampas et al. 2004). 
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the most cost effective route given the transaction costs of designing a truly stochastic 437 
control framework
28
.  438 
Goetz et al. (2006) extend the need to complement regulating the intensive margin 439 
with restrictions on the extensive margin further. They modelled a dynamic product mix 440 
which was not restricted to a pre-specified set of production (crop) activities - and 441 
demonstrated that regulating the extensive margin should extend from land under 442 
cultivation to land allocated to particular crops. They report the superiority of combining a 443 
spatially non-differentiated land use specific (crop) taxes
29
 with a uniform N input tax. 444 
However the introduction of a crop specific instrument to regulate the extensive margin is 445 
likely to raise enforcement costs. The absence of transaction costs, i.e. explicitly or implicitly 446 
zero costs, ”creates confusion and errors both in defining the problem and in the search for 447 
solutions” (Vatn 1998). Unfortunately, there are few reliable transaction cost estimates 448 
(Shortle et al. 1998; McCann et al. 1999; Kampas et al. 2004) and the addition of a crop 449 
specific land use tax may have regional political implications as well.   450 
In contrast, we propose regulating the extensive margin by using land setaside, as 451 
part of a MI approach. Managerial approaches are arguably cheaper to implement, since 452 
existing stocking density and set-aside restrictions currently enforced as cross-compliance 453 
requirements under the European-wide Single Farm Payment Scheme mean a data 454 
collection and monitoring infrastructure is already in place. In fact the monitoring costs of 455 
permanent setaside would be significantly lesser. In addition, setaside is associated with 456 
reduced insecticide, herbicide, fungicide, nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment pollution 457 
(Ribaudo et al. 1994). The accumulative transaction costs of designing, enforcing and 458 
                                                 
28
 Assuming wetter winter conditions are likely to prevail in Scotland with climate change (Kerr et al. 1999) it is possible 
future diffuse nitrogen regulation may be similar to that outlined in the ‘wet’ weather year scenario we consider.    
29
 Although it isn't clear whether they considered spatially undifferentiated land use taxes differentiated by crop type alone 
or crop type and cultivation technique. Obviously, the more differentiation the greater the enforcement cost. 
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monitoring separate economic instruments to control each NPP externality may be 459 
prohibitive and warrant a more integrated and simpler approach. We note that a problem-460 
by problem, information-intensive approach to NPP is not practical, and the focus on such 461 
approaches in the economics literature possibly explains the limited uptake of economic 462 
instruments to control complex agricultural externalities. Managerial options can also 463 
generate ancillary environmental benefits in terms of wildlife habitat and landscape amenity 464 
value which would increase their cost-effectiveness by reducing their net social costs 465 
(Hanley et al. 1999) and sustain the multi-functionality of agriculture. 466 
 467 
5. Conclusions 468 
This study has focussed on evaluating combinations of economic instruments with 469 
managerial measures to achieve a reduction in nitrate pollution while maintaining an  470 
environmental target of ensuring minimum river flows. Such multiple-objective 471 
management seems likely to become more prevalent in the EU as a result of the Water 472 
Framework Directive, whilst policy evolution seems certain to take in a mixed instrument 473 
approach, combining economic incentives with regulation. For economists to lobby policy 474 
makers on the basis of a preference for “pure” economic instruments seems likely to be 475 
unproductive in political economy terms, and this paper has investigated what the pay-offs 476 
(both positive and negative) might be of focussing instead on a mixed approach. 477 
Surprisingly, combining economic instruments and direct regulation to control NPP has not 478 
been highlighted in the economics literature before. MIs make sense when the nature of the 479 
environmental problem(s) being considered (highly spatially diverse and time-varying; many 480 
actors; imperfectly observable actions and effects) means that neither economic nor 481 
regulatory approaches alone can achieve acceptable levels of effectiveness and efficiency. 482 
23 
 
Conceptually, would a MI strategy be better than a single instrument in another 483 
catchment? The transferability of our results depends on weather and the degree of 484 
regulatory strictness. In catchments with wet weather MI comprising of economic and 485 
managerial regulation will fare better. Of course, defining ‘wet weather’ is relative and 486 
indeed determining a pattern in instrument efficiency ‘cross-overs’ warrants further 487 
research. 488 
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Figure 1: Catchment Model – Crop, livestock type, soil, N application, irrigation scheduling are the main decision variables 
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Figure 2. Mean Weather Without MAF
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Figure 3. Wet Weather With/Without 90th Percentile MAF   
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 Table 1. Percentage Reduction in Catchment Resource Cost of Policies at the 8 and 4 Week Regulatory Target  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*: Overachieves regulatory target.  NA: Regulatory target not achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weather Mean weather Wet weather 
River Flow Restriction 90
th
 percentile No MAF restriction 
       With and without MAF     
      restriction 
Regulatory Target 8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 
Emission tax (£/mg N ) 1.035 1.235 0.660 1.431 2.304 3.821 
N Input tax (IT) (£/kg N) 1.705 2.417 1.170 6.876 9.211 28.531 
Input quota (% restriction) 1.567 2.322 1.146 4.736 9.637 34.647 
FSDR (30% LU/ha) + IT 2.541 6.661 2.465 7.340 6.957 25.781 
FLR (14% ha) + IT 7.675 7.956 4.002 6.358 6.991 22.134 
FLR (22% ha) + IT 7.853 9.710 6.689 9.341 7.670 19.106 
FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
17.272* 17.272 14.671* 18.245 14.681* 15.158 
FSDR (50% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
19.138* 19.138 18.808* 18.808 17.034* 17.218 
FLR (20% ha) + FSDR (LU/ha) 12.004 18.862 9.250 NA 13.221 44.840 
FLR (‘setaside’, i.e. % of arable 
land) 
10.291 NA 9.288 NA 13.482 20.476 
FSDR (LU/ha) 9.699 NA 9.103 NA 14.195 NA 
  Table 2. Catchment Policy Ranking Under Different River Flow and Weather Conditions 
Weather Mean weather Wet weather 
River Flow Restriction 90
th
 percentile No MAF restriction 
With and without MAF 
restriction 
Regulatory Target  8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 
Emission tax (£/mg N ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N Input tax (IT) (£/kg N) 3 3 2 4 5 8 
Input quota (% restriction) 2 2 3 2 6 9 
FSDR (30% LU/ha) + IT 4 4 4 5 2 7 
FLR (14% ha) + IT 5 5 5 3 3 6 
FLR (22% ha) + IT 6 6 6 6 4 4 
FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
10* 7 10* 7 10* 2 
FSDR (50% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
11* 9 11* 8 11* 3 
FLR (20% ha) + FSDR (LU/ha) 9 8 7 NA 7 10 
FLR (‘setaside’, i.e. % of arable 
land) 
8 NA 9 NA 8 5 
FSDR (LU/ha) 7 NA 8 NA 9 NA 
*: Overachieves regulatory target. NA: Regulatory target not achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. Instrument Levels to Induce Compliance with Regulatory Targets under Modelled Scenarios 
 
Weather Mean weather Wet weather 
River Flow Restriction 90
th
 percentile No MAF restriction 
With and without MAF 
restriction 
Regulatory Target 8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 8 week 4 week 
Emission tax (£/mg N ) 35.40 75.40 45.50 90.50 51.60 57.20 
N Input tax (IT) (£/kg N) 1.2 1.56 1.3 3.56 7.15 24.53 
Input quota (% restriction) 34.80 43.65 35.25 63.25 79.05 97.00 
FSDR (30% LU/ha) + IT 0.86 2.66 0.88 3.11 2.87 22.12 
FLR (14% ha) + IT 0.68 0.92 0.81 2.09 2.23 14.6 
FLR (22% ha) + IT 0.52 1.98 0.54 2.32 1.3 11.12 
FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
0.42* 1.5 0.42* 4.1 0.42* 1.25 
FSDR (50% LU/ha) + FLR (35% 
ha) + IT 
0.42* 2.02 0.42* 3.25 0.42* 0.9 
FLR (20% ha) + FSDR (LU/ha) 23.5 62.5 38.5 NA 58 78.70 
FLR (‘setaside’, i.e. % of arable 
land) 
33.3 NA 34.6 NA 49.1 74.5 
FSDR (LU/ha) 66.5 NA 67.5 NA 76 NA 
*: Overachieves regulatory target. NA: Regulatory target not achieved. 
 Table 4: Policy Ranking and Water Metrics (mg/l N) under Mean Weather, 8 week target with 90
th
 percentile MAF Restriction 
Regulatory Policy Rank Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
80
th
 
percentile 
90
th
 
percentile 
Maximum 
BASELINE*  10.272 10.272 5.385 -0.359 -1.297 14.671 16.177 16.969 
Emission tax (£/mg N ) 1 7.469 8.072 4.421 -0.233 -1.505 11.544 12.528 13.483 
N Input tax (IT) (£/kg) 3 7.512 8.149 4.295 -0.265 -1.489 11.553 12.470 13.189 
Input quota (% restriction) 2 7.282 8.138 4.444 -0.252 -1.597 11.551 12.404 13.029 
FSDR (30% LU/ha) + IT 4 8.189 8.814 4.449 -0.375 -1.173 11.601 13.897 14.374 
FLR (14% ha) + IT 5 7.691 8.212 4.552 -0.201 -1.419 11.544 13.212 14.622 
FLR (22% ha) + IT 6 8.200 8.018 4.722 0.022 -1.114 11.626 14.911 16.146 
FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR 
(35% ha) + IT 
 10** 6.785 6.149 5.026 0.616 -0.594 9.175 15.213 17.315 
FSDR (50% LU/ha) + FLR 
(35% ha) + IT 
 11** 6.745 5.709 5.065 0.987 -0.011 8.491 15.313 18.128 
FLR (20% ha) + FSDR 
(LU/ha) 
9 
7.874 8.005 5.041 0.076 
-1.173 
11.634 15.296 16.919 
FLR (‘setaside’, i.e. % of 
arable land) 
8 
8.053 7.940 5.276 0.141 
-1.161 
11.672 15.789 17.319 
FSDR (LU/ha) 7 8.058 7.877 5.239 0.174 -1.148 11.612 15.245 17.401 
*: Baseline water metrics for mean weather  with 90th percentile MAF restriction. **: Overachieves regulatory target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Policy Ranking and Water Metrics (mg/l N) under Wet Weather, 8 week target with and without MAF restrictions 
Regulatory Policy Rank Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
80
th
 
percentile 
90
th
 
percentile 
Maximum 
BASELINE*  9.872 9.872 6.356 0.143 -1.314 17.156 18.785 21.813 
Emission tax (£/mg N ) 1 6.957 6.666 4.300 0.137 -1.227 11.232 12.656 14.983 
N Input tax (IT) (£/kg) 5 6.674 6.408 4.528 0.187 -1.318 11.370 12.821 14.730 
Input quota (% 
restriction) 
6 
6.743 6.408 4.466 0.200 
-1.305 
11.366 12.845 14.563 
FSDR (30% LU/ha) + IT 2 6.962 6.246 4.338 0.378 -1.058 11.328 13.206 15.756 
FLR (14% ha) + IT 3 6.812 6.347 4.452 0.361 -1.082 11.318 12.894 16.047 
FLR (22% ha) + IT 4 7.104 6.444 4.481 0.455 -0.831 11.324 13.048 17.312 
FSDR (40% LU/ha) + FLR 
(35% ha) + IT 
  10** 7.232 5.950 5.383 1.038 0.324 10.528 15.859 22.339 
FSDR (50% LU/ha) + FLR 
(35% ha) + IT 
  11** 6.838 5.491 5.643 1.210 0.764 9.853 15.438 22.519 
FLR (20% ha) + FSDR 
(LU/ha) 
7 
7.852 6.788 5.677 0.772 
-0.276 
11.943 16.524 21.863 
FLR (‘setaside’, i.e. % of 
arable land) 
8 
7.576 6.505 5.335 0.833 
-0.064 
11.323 15.714 21.901 
FSDR (LU/ha) 9 7.537 6.488 5.331 0.819 -0.122 11.322 15.703 21.675 
*: Baseline water metrics for wet weather with and without 90th percentile MAF restriction. **: Overachieves regulatory target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of empirical results 
1) Single instruments display efficient abatement 'fatigue' at higher regulatory targets. The 
relative cost effectiveness of MIs improve as: 
a) the regulatory target is tightened, and 
b) as weather conditions become wetter. 
2) Irrigation water abstraction restrictions required to comply with MAF do not 
fundamentally alter instruments ranking - however they do alter required instrument 
levels. 
3) The existence of 'cross-overs' imply that cost effective rankings maybe target dependent 
and vary across weather scenarios. 
4) Water quality metrics reveal that FLR MIs  pollution levels are more tightly clustered 
around the mean - even though they permit higher ambient N pollution events than 
stand alone economic instruments. 
 
 
